You are on a game show: three closed doors. Behind one there is a car, behind the other two a goat. You choose door 11. The host, who knows what is behind each door, opens door 33 and shows a goat. He asks you: “do you want to keep door 11 or switch to door 22?”.

Intuition says: two closed doors, a 50505050 choice, it does not matter whether you switch. Wrong. Switching doubles the probability of winning (2/32/3 against 1/31/3).

Property — Explanation via Bayes

Let Ai=A_i = “the car is behind door ii”, B=B = “the host opens door 33”. By symmetry P(A1)=P(A2)=P(A3)=1/3P(A_1)=P(A_2)=P(A_3)=1/3. Knowing the host’s choices:

  • P(BA1)=1/2P(B\mid A_1) = 1/2 (car behind 11: the host opens 22 or 33 at random, 50%50\%);
  • P(BA2)=1P(B\mid A_2) = 1 (car behind 22: the host must open door 33, he cannot open door 22);
  • P(BA3)=0P(B\mid A_3) = 0 (he would not open the car’s door).

Total probability: P(B)=1312+131+130=1/2P(B) = \tfrac13\cdot\tfrac12 + \tfrac13\cdot 1 + \tfrac13\cdot 0 = 1/2. We apply Bayes: P(A1B)=P(BA1)P(A1)P(B)=(1/2)(1/3)1/2=13,P(A2B)=1(1/3)1/2=23.P(A_1\mid B) = \frac{P(B\mid A_1)P(A_1)}{P(B)} = \frac{(1/2)(1/3)}{1/2} = \frac{1}{3}, \qquad P(A_2\mid B) = \frac{1\cdot(1/3)}{1/2} = \frac{2}{3}.

Observation — Why intuition is wrong

The host does not choose at random: he has information that we do not have. His conditional choice “transfers” the probability 1/31/3 of the discarded door onto door 22, which becomes 2/32/3. Door 11 stays fixed at 1/31/3 because our initial choice is set before the host acts, so it receives no update. It is the same mechanism as diagnostic tests: it is not enough to count the closed doors, one must know how the current state was reached. The classic narrative of the paradox (with the popular debate sparked by Marilyn vos Savant’s answer in the 1990s) is told by Dunham (Ch. 11).

Example — Simulation with 9999 doors

Amplified version: 100100 doors, 11 car, 9999 goats. You choose door 11; the host opens 9898 doors showing 9898 goats, leaving you to choose between door 11 and a mystery door. The same logic says: P(win if you switch)=99/100P(\text{win if you switch}) = 99/100. Made explicit in this form, the paradox disappears.

Topics: Probabilita
Concepts: Paradosso di monty hall · Probabilita condizionata · Teorema di bayes
Methods: Bayes · Prob condizionata
Skills: Calcolo probabilita · Ragionare per casi